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There is no agreement among legal writers as to exactly what a pre-
sumption is or how it operates. Most are agreed that a presumption is
a legal mechanism which, unless sufficient evidence is introduced to
render the presumption inoperative, deems one fact to be true when
the truth of another fact has been established. In legal terminology, the
fact which may or must be deemed proved is called the "fact presumed,"
and the fact whose truth must be established before the "fact pre-
sumed" will be deemed true is called the "fact proved." If sufficient
evidence is proffered to render the presumption inoperative, the pre-
sumption is commonly said to have been "overcome" or "rebutted."
Since the decision of Mobile J. & K.C.R.R. v. Turnipseed it has
been fairly certain that the due process requirements of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments will void the operation of presumptive hin-
guage which works in an unreasonable or capricious manner. Since
the decision of Bailey v. Alabama2 it has likewise been clear that
presumptive language may not be used to circumvent substantive con-
stitutional rights. In the years since Bailey and Turnipseed, the Su-
preme Court has struggled to develop tests which isolate the illegal
presumption from the allowable presumption. Although the Court has
occasionally indicated in dicta that more stringent scrutiny will be
given to presumptions operating against criminal defendants than to
those operating in civil cases,3 the Court has used the same formulae
to judge the legitimacy of presumptions in both areas. Only in Leary
t BA. 1966, Yale University; LL.B. 1969, Harvard University.
-iI BA. 1965, University of Southern Florida; LL.B. 1969, Harvard University.
1. 219 U.S. 55 (1910).
2. 219 U.S. 219 (1911).
3. See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 515, 525 (1957).
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v. United States4 did the Court finally give express recognition to the
proposition that a more stringent standard might be required in
criminal cases, but the question was left unanswered.
Intuitively, we feel that there are special considerations involved in
the review of presumptions in the criminal area. The latitude of the
state in defining the conditions under which a civil remedy may or
may not be given is much wider under the due process clause than the
latitude which it has in defining or altering the circumstances under
which a criminal defendant shall suffer loss of life or liberty. One of
the objectives of this article is to bring the special considerations
applicable to presumptions against the criminal defendant under the
due process clause from the level of intuition to the level of articulated
principle.
Regardless of whether they are applied in the civil or criminal field,
the constitutional tests currently used to evaluate presumptive lan-
guage contain serious flaws. The Leary decision made clear that the
dominant constitutional test to be applied to presumptive language is
the "rational connection test." Although first stated in Turnipsmed,
the best known statement of this test appears in Tot v. United States:
Under our decisions, a statutory presumption cannot be sustained
if there be no rational connection between the fact proved and the
ultimate fact presumed, if the inference of the one from the proof
of the other is arbitrary because of lack of connection.6
An examination of the cases in which the Court has relied, or claims
to have relied, on the rational connection test reveals a number of open
questions which stand as weaknesses in the test as now formulated.0
First, it seems obvious that the rational connection must be stronger in
some circumstances than in others, even if the presumption is worded
the same way in both circumstances. A comparison of the Court's de-
cisions in Turnipseed and in Western and Atlantic Ry. v. Henderson"
illustrates this best. Both cases involved a statutory presumption of
negligence in suits arising from accidents involving a railroad com-
pany's equipment and resulting in death. In both cases, the presump.
4. 395 U.S. 6, 36 n.64 (1969).
5. 319 U.S. 463, 467 (1943).
6. See, e.g., Lindsley v. Natural Gas Co., 220 US. 61 (1911), Luria v. Unitcd Staten,
231 U.S. 9 (1913); McFarland v. American Sugar Co., 241 U.S. 79 (1916); Hawes v.
Georgia, 258 U.S. 1 (1922); Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U.S. 178 (1925); Manley v.
Georgia, 279 U.S. 1 (1929); Western & At. R.R. v. Henderson, 279 U.S. 639 (1929);
Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82 (1934); Tot v. United States, 319 US. 403 (1913;
Gainey v. United States, 380 U.S. 63 (1965); United States v. Romano, 82 U.s. I80 (1965).
7. 279 US. 639 (1929).
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tion was interpreted by the court below to require the defendant to
produce some evidence of due care to escape a directed verdict. In
Turnipseed, if such evidence had been introduced, the issue of negli-
gence would have been submitted to the jury with instructions that
the plaintiff had to prove defendant's negligence by a preponderance
of the evidence. In Henderson, however, according to the lower court,
if evidence had been introduced by the defendant, the issue of negli-
gence would. have been submitted to the jury with instructions that
they were to find for the plaintiff unless the defendant proved due
care by a preponderance of the evidence. Both cases involved the same
fact-proved, fact-presumed relationship. The strength of the inferen-
tial connection between the fact proved and the fact presumed was
probably the same in both cases, and probably strong enough to justify
using the term rational-i.e., as we interpret it, more likely than not.
Yet in Turnipseed the presumption was held rational, and in Hender-
son it was struck down as irrational.
It seems apparent that rationality was not the only factor involved in
the decisions. One difference between the cases is clear. As opposed to
the interpretation of the court in Turnipseed, the court in Henderson
interpreted the presumption so as to switch the burden of persuasion
on the issue of negligence from the plaintiff to the defendant. Ap-
parently, the rational connection was not strong enough to overcome
this added disadvantage. Apparently we must not only consider the
strength of the connection between the fact proved and the fact pre-
sumed, but also the way in which the presumption affects the relative
positions of the parties. But the Court has never indicated the stan-
dards or principles according to which we should consider this factor.
Another goal of our article will be to suggest how courts should
analyze the application of presumptive language and what effect dif-
ferent applications should have on the validity of the presumption.
The Supreme Court did consider the magnitude of the disadvantage
created by the operation of a presumption in formulating the second
constitutional test applied to presumptions, the comparative con-
venience test. The test was first formulated by Justice Cardozo in a
dictum in Morrison v. California, when he wrote:
The decisions are manifold that within limits of reason and fair-
ness the burden of proof may be lifted from the state in criminal
prosecutions and cast on the defendant. The limits are in sub-
stance these, that the state shall have proved enough to make itjust for the defendant to be required to repel what has been
proved with excuse or explanation, or at least that upon a balanc-
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ing of convenience or of the opportunities for knowledge the
shifting of the burden will be found to be an aid to the accusor
without subjecting the accused to hardship or oppression.
.. For a transfer of the burden, experience must teach that
the evidence held to be inculpatory has at least a sinister sig-
nificance .... or if this at times be lacking, there must be in any
event a manifest disparity in convenience of proof and oppor-
tunity for knowledge, as, for instance, where a general prohibition
is applicable to every one who is unable to bring himself within
the range of an exception. Greenleaf, Evidence, Vol. 1, § 79. The
list is not exhaustive. Other instances may have arisen or may
develop in the future where the balance of convenience can be
redressed without oppression to the defendant through the same
procedural expedient. The decisive considerations are too vari-
able, too much distinctions of degree, too dependent in last analysis
upon a common sense estimate of fairness or of facilities of proof,
to be crowded into a formula. One can do no more than adumbrate
them; sharper definition must await the specific case as it arises.8
Thus stated, the test seeks to determine if the burden imposed on the
opponent of the presumption is justified by the aid it gives to the pro-
ponent, or, in a criminal case, if the burden placed upon the defendant
is outweighed by that lifted from the prosecution. 9
Although Cardozo's language is eloquent, it does not shed much
light on how one is to administer the comparative convenience test. The
only principle which can be seen in the cases in which the test has been
applied'0 is that, in both civil and criminal actions, the inconvenience
of the party for whom the presumption operates in producing proof
will affect the standard by which the court will judge the presumption.
Presumably, less of a rational connection is necessary to sustain a pre-
sumption if the party aided by the presumption would otherwise be
at a severe disadvantage in mustering proof of the presumed fact. Ex-
actly how a court is to make a judgment on this matter is not made
clear, and indeed, Cardozo disclaims any attempt at setting out guide-
lines for such a judgment. Another object of our article is to set out
8. 291 US. 82, 88-91 (1933).
9. In Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943), the Court asserted that the relative
convenience test was merely a "corollary" to the rational connection test and that the
latter was controlling, inasmuch as the relative convenience test could not save a presump.
tion from constitutional infirmity in the absence of a rational connection between the
fact proved and the fact presumed. Without real explanation, Mr. Justice Harlan afflnned
this proposition in Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. at 25. The authors contend in passing
that the word "corollary" is somewhat inappropriate. Truly correlative tests cannot
reach different results since a corollary is merely a necessary inference from a stated prl.
ciple or rule.
10. Rossi v. United States, 289 U.S. 89 (1932); United States v. Fleischman, 339 U.S.
349 (1949).
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the criteria by which questions of the convenience of proof should be
taken into account in judging the validity of presumptions against
criminal defendants under the Constitution.
The varying application of the presumptions in Henderson and
Turnipseed correspond to the interpretations suggested by two of the
most famous commentators in the field of presumptions, Edmund
Morris Morgan and James Bradley Thayer. By the Thayer approach,
once the opponent of the presumption has introduced evidence which
would justify a jury finding in his favor, the presumption "drops
out" of the case, and the issue is submitted to the jury as if the pre-
sumption had never existed.-1 As in Turnipseed, the burden of per-
suasion remains on the party for whom the presumption had previously
operated. By the Morgan approach,- as exemplified in Henderson, the
presumption imposes on the opponent of the presumption not only
the burden of introducing evidence but also the burden of persuasion
as to the issue involved. The operational results of this interpretation
of the presumption in Henderson are very similar to those which would
have been produced if the cause of action were "injury by railroad
equipment resulting in death," and a statute provided the defense of
"operation of equipment with due care."
The use of the Morgan approach to presumptions in the area of
criminal law presents significant problems, for in effect it redefines
the crime charged. For example, let us examine the Marihuana Im-
port Act.'3 The Act purports to define a criminal offense whose ele-
ments are (1) possession of marihuana, (2) the imported status of said
marihuana, (3) the illegality of said importation, and (4) the knowledge
of defendent of each of these facts. The statute creates a presumption
which, generously interpreting its obscure language, presumes importa-
tion, illegality and knowledge from the fact of possession. In Leary v.
United States the trial court's instructions to the jury interpreted this
presumption to operate approximately in accordance with Morgan's
analysis. 4 The defendant, upon proof of possession, had to prove "to
the satisfaction of the jury" (a standard which is probably at least as
rigorous as "a preponderance of the evidence") either non-importation,
legality of importation, or non-knowledge, in order to escape convic-
tion. The defendant would not be in a significantly different position if
11. J. THmA.IER, PRELiMINARY TRATms ON EVmIENCE 337 (1896).
12. E. MORGAN, BAsic PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 33-35 (1954).
13. 21 U.S.C. § 176(a) (1964).
14. See Lear' v. United States, 383 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1967).
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the crime had been defined as possession, and defenses of non-importa-
tion, etc., had been provided in the statute. It becomes obvious that
there is an intimate relationship between the operation of a Morgan
presumption and the creation of an affirmative defense. But do the same
principles of due process apply to the creation of defenses as apply to
the creation of a Morgan presumption? The Supreme Court has never
attempted to put forth constitutional standards for reviewing the
designation of an issue as an affirmative defense rather than an element
of a crime. We believe that such standards are necessary, and, con-
sequently, shall try to develop them in this article.
The last problem with which we deal involves the language by
which the duty of the jury in regard to the operation of a presumption
is conveyed to those who are jurors. Some courts, for example, in in-
structing juries, state that the trier of fact may infer the fact presumed
from the fact proved, rather than that the trier of fact shall infer
the fact presumed. This permissive attitude toward the operation
of presumptions in criminal cases has been adopted by the American
Law Institute in the Model Penal Code. 1 We believe that this ap-
proach gives rise to perplexing problems in regard to maintaining the
proper role of the jury.
Similar problems arise from presumptions in criminal statutes which
are drawn in language which makes it difficult to determine what stan-
dards the jury must follow in determining facts. For example, the
presumption in the Marihuana Import Act, held unconstitutional in
Leary, reads as follows:
Whenever on trial for a violation of this subsection, the defen-
dant is shown to have or to have had the marihuana in his pos-
session, such possession shall be deemed sufficient evidence to
authorize conviction unless the defendant explains his possession
to the satisfaction of the jury.16
Phrases such as "sufficient evidence" may, as we shall discuss later, in-
terfere with the court's ability to control the jury and to establish
correct standards of proof. The Supreme Court faced a similarly
worded presumption in Gainey v. United States,1 and chose (as was
astutely pointed out by Justice Black in dissent)18 to rewrite the pre-
sumption rather than face the problems it created. In Leary both
15. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
16. 21 U.S.C. § 176(a) (1964).
17. 380 U.S. 63 (1965).
18. 380 US. at 76-77.
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Justice Black and the Court ignored the problems created by the use
of the phrase "sufficient evidence." The final objective of this article
is to establish criteria by which such language may be examined.
II. Definitions
To fulfill the objectives outlined above, it is necessary to define the
terms we shall use in the rest of the discussion rather more precisely
than we have heretofore defined them.
Germane Issues:
When the state or plaintiff comes into court demanding that some
action be taken by the court, the substantive law deems certain issues
"germane" to whether what is demanded will be done. By our use of
the term "germane issues" we mean all of those issues which must be
resolved one way or the other before the court can come to a decision.
Germane issues are characterized as being part of the case of the plain-
tiff (prosecution) or the defendant. Any criminal or civil action can
be conceptualized in terms of this division: if the plaintiff or prosecu-
tion establishes A, B and C, etc., then what it wants will be done
unless the defendant establishes X, Y or Z, etc. In a civil action for
negligence, for example, A, B and C may represent proof of the
defendant's negligence and the damages resulting therefrom. X, Y and
Z might represent contributory negligence, the plaintiffs assumption
of risk, and the fact that plaintiff's injury was beyond the scope of
the defendant's liability. In a criminal case for murder, Y might
represent self-defense and Z, insanity. As used above, A, B, and C are
sometimes referred to as elements of the plaintiff's case or elements of
the crime, and X, Y and Z as affirmative defenses.
The Three Burdens:
Three burdens are associated with each germane issue. The first is
the burden of pleading, the responsibility of alleging that the neces-
sary facts are true. The second is the burden of producing evidence, or,
in some contexts, the burden of going forward with the evidence. The
third is the burden of persuasion, the burden of convincing the trier
of fact that what is alleged is true to the standard of certainty re-
quired by law. Normally, the plaintiff or prosecution must bear each
of the three burdens in regard to each element of its case or of the
crime, and the defendant must bear each burden in regard to af-
firmative defenses. In a number of cases, however, the burdens with
regard to a specific germane issue are divided between the plaintiff
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and the defendant. For example, the plaintiff may have to allege A
in his complaint or indictment; the defendant may have to present
evidence of not-A in order to escape the law deeming A to be true;
and the jury may be instructed that they must be convinced of not-A
to a preponderance of the evidence. Is this issue part of the plaintiff's
case, or is it an affirmative defense which the law requires the plaintiff
to raise for the defendant as a matter of course? We believe that at-
tempting to analyze each of these hybrids separately as a different
mechanism would be of little use. In terms of importance, the burden
of persuasion is much more significant for purposes of classification
than the formalities of pleading or the less onerous burden of produc-
ing evidence. We will therefore consider the question of who bears
the burden of persuasion dispositive for classifying an issue as part of
the plaintiff's case or as an element of the defense. Consequently, in
terms of our analysis, if the prosecution has the burden of persuasion
as to an issue, the issue may properly be characterized as an "element
of the crime"; if the defendant has the burden of persuasion as to an
issue, the issue may be called an affirmative defense.
Presumptions:
A presumption is that legal device which imposes the burden of
introducing evidence as to a given issue upon the opponent of the
party who has the burden of persuasion as to that issue. Thus, if in a
particular jurisdiction the question of insanity is treated such that the
defendant must produce some evidence of insanity in order to get the
question of insanity before the jury, but the prosecution has the burden
of persuading the jury that the defendant is sane, then the issue of in-
sanity is governed by a presumption and there is a presumption of
sanity.
As another example, let us examine the crime of possession of nar.
cotics with intent to sell. The elements of the crime are (1) possession
and (2) intent to sell. In addition, assume that the statute has the follow-
ing language:
The intent to sell shall be deemed proved from proof of the
possession of more than an ounce of the narcotic substance, un-
less the defendant introduces evidence, which if believed, would
warrant the jury's finding no intent to sell.
An individual's intent to sell narcotics (the fact presumed) is presumed
when he possesses more than an ounce of the substance (the fact
proved). The statute imposes the burden of introducing evidence upon
the opponent (i.e., the defendant) of the party having the burden of
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persuasion (i.e., the prosecution). It is important to note that a pre-
sumption, as we have defined it, never "shifts the burden of proof."
We are therefore rejecting the Morgan view of presumptions, which
asserts that a presumption shifts this burden, and accepting the Thayer
view. Although we side with Thayer as to the definition of a presump-
tion, however we do not disagree in all cases with the result which
Morgan reached in regard to allocating the burden of persuasion when
he dealt with devices which he called presumptions. We merely do not
call those devices presumptions.
Assumptions:
Earlier in the article, we set forth the rule that a given issue was in
the case of the party who had the burden of persuasion as to that
issue. Now we must ask an unusual question-a question asked to our
knowledge by only one earlier commentator, Otis Harrison Fisk. 0
What is the legal device which imposes the burden of persuasion and
the risk of non-persuasion, as to a given issue, on one party or the
other? Asked another way, what is the legal device that renders a
"germane issue" part of the case of one party, as opposed to the other?
As suggested by Fisk, we shall call the device which imposes a burden
of persuasion an assumption. Where the plaintiff or the prosecution
has the burden of persuasion as to issues A, B and C, the law assumes
not-A, not-B and not-C until the plaintiff or prosecution persuades
the jury otherwise. As can be seen, there is operating in every criminal
trial not a presumption of innocence, but an assumption of innocence,
since the prosecution has the burden of persuasion with regard to the
defendant's guilt. Similarly, for every issue X, Y or Z, there is an as-
sumption of not-X, not-Y, and not-Z which can only be overcome if
the defendant is able to persuade the jury otherwise. It is helpful to
remember that when an assumption operates against a defendant, it
does nothing more mysterious than to impose a burden of persuasion
upon him and thereby create an affirmative defense.
It follows from our definition of assumption, that an assumption is
operative in every case in which a presumption exists. An assumption
is the device which allocates the burden of persuasion. A presumption
imposes a burden of introducing evidence as to a given issue on the
19. 0. FRs, THE LAw OF PRaor iN JuDiciAL PnocrxNcs (1928). Otis Harrison Fisk is
a brilliant analyst to whom the authors owe much of the direction in their thinking
about presumptions. It is unfortunate that he was never recognized or studied by the
most influential writers on presumptions.
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opponent of the party who has the burden of persuasion as to that issue.
Therefore, whenever there is a presumption of X, such that one party
has the burden of introducing evidence as to X, there is also in opera-
tion an assumption of not-X. Once the presumption is overcome, the
party in whose favor the presumption operated must defeat the as-
sumption by proving X to whatever standard is established by law.2 0
A Word of Justification:
Reconsider now our earlier treatment of the Turnipseed and Hen-
derson cases. The device in operation in Turnipseed was a true pre-
sumption in our terms because it imposed a burden of introducing
evidence upon the opponent (the defendant) of the party who had
the burden of persuasion on the issue (the plaintiff). In Henderson,
on the other hand, the device was not in our terms a presumption,
but rather an assumption. The defendant in Henderson had the bur-
den of persuasion on the issue of negligence. We believe that im-
measurable confusion in the law has resulted from calling these
two very different devices by the same name. The legal consequences
of the two devices are significantly different in terms of the degree of
evidentiary hardship incurred by the parties. The burden of persuasion
entails a much heavier evidentiary burden than the burden of in-
troducing evidence. As will become apparent later in this article, the
difference in the evidentiary burden imposed by the two devices has a
critical bearing upon the implementation of standards of constitutional
scrutiny. We believe that acceptance of the terminology we have de-
fined will avoid any confusion in the future.
III. The Effect of Presumptions in the Light of Due Process
The purpose of this section is to set forth workable standards for
distinguishing constitutional from unconstitutional presumptions and
constitutional from unconstitutional assumptions. We must first ex-
amine how such legal devices might infringe the constitutional rights
of criminal defendants; we can then turn to the more important task
of formulating sound standards by which the operation of these devices
may be kept within the bounds of constitutional safeguards.
Let us begin by considering presumptions, a much easier starting
point. Consider a crime defined by elements A, B and C. Absent any
20. Throughout this article, the terms "presumptive language" and "presumptive de.
vice" have been used, for lack of any better generic term, to include both presumptioti
and assumptions.
"17.4
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presumption, the prosecution would have the burden of proving each
of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. There is, of
course, no set formula for mustering such proof. The prosecution may
produce abundant evidence as to each element; or it may produce only
scanty evidence as to one or more of the elements, and then argue, for
example, that by drawing on their general experience, the jury may
reasonably infer that if defendant has, beyond a reasonable doubt,
done A and B, then surely beyond a reasonable doubt he has done C
as well. If, in the light of the total proof offered in the case, the in-
ferential connection between A-plus-B and C is such that from
proof of A-plus-B the jury might rationally infer C beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, the verdict will not be upset. This inferential process
is inherent in the use of a jury to determine criminal liability. While
the accuracy of this process has never been adequately measured, our
legal system postulates that it provides the greatest guarantees that the
criminal defendant will be afforded a fair determination of his guilt or
innocence.
Let us now consider a presumption that "if A and B are proved," C
is also proved, unless the defendant introduces sufficient evidence tend-
ing to show not-C. This presumption alters the normal guilt deter-
mining process in two fundamental ways:
1. It requires a defendant to come forth with evidence of not-C
before he can enjoy the untrammeled jury process--i.e., he must
participate and perhaps testify himself.
2. If the defendant does not produce sufficient evidence of not-
C, he is deprived of the natural response of the jury to infer or not
to infer C from the proof of A and B, because the presumption
requires that C be deemed true automatically if the jury finds
A and B.21
21. Earlier we stated that when a party fails to meet a burden of introducing evi--
dence upon an issue, that issue is not submitted to the jury. Rather it is decided against
the party who failed to meet the burden of introducing evidence. Under this ie0m, if the
defendant fails to introduce any evidence which, if believed, would justify a jury's finding
of not-C, then if the prosecution has proved A and B, C would automatically be deemed
true; the jury would have no say in the matter. This result has disturbed a number of
commentators, who maintain that such an operation is a denial of a trial by jury on the
issue; rather than declare that the finding of C is automatic, they would prefer always to
let the issue of C go to the jury. When the issue of C is submitted to the jury, according
to this view, the jury is to be instructed along the following lines:
While the presumed fact (C) must on all the evidence be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt, the law declares that the jury may regard facts giving rise to the presump-
don as sufficient evidence of the presumed fact.
This is an expression of what we call the "permissible inference doctrine"--the finding
of C is not held to be automatic and beyond the will of the jury, but rather is held to
be a "permissible inference" which, at least in theory, the jury need not make. We dall
discuss the implications of a "permissible inference" in a later section of the article.
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If the defendant successfully overcomes the presumption so that the
prosecution must actually prove C beyond a reasonable doubt, any
infringement of the defendant's constitutional rights resulting from
the two alterations of the guilt determining process might be con-
sidered harmless. We do not wish to minimize the hardship imposed
even upon successful defendants who have been forced to come forth
with evidence, especially those who have been forced to take the wit-
ness stand for lack of recourse to other sources of proof tending to show
not-C. In this regard, we suggest that defendants who are forced to
offer their own testimony of not-C, who restrict their testimony to
proof of not-C, and who would not otherwise have chosen to testify,
should enjoy severe limitations upon being cross-examined. Our pri-
mary concern, however, is with the defendant who has not mustered
such overcoming evidence and against whom the presumption operates
in its full force.
On behalf of these defendants, constitutional arguments can be made
along the following lines:
1. As to the element which is presumed from the elements
proved, the defendant no longer enjoys any benefits from the
"presumption" (more properly the "assumption") of innocence. In
practical effect, although not technically, he is no longer assumed
innocent of the element C.
2. The defendant is no longer provided a jury trial upon the
element presumed, inasmuch as he is deprived of the untrammeled
response of the jury as to that element.
3. Since the determination of the presumed element is auto-
matic, the defendant is denied a trial altogether on that element:
the trial as to that element was conducted in the hearing rooms and
floors of the legislatures, or was effected by case-law development
to which he was not a party.4. As a corollary to (3), the defendant was not allowed to con-
front his "accusors."
5. The defendant may be punished, not as a result of all ele-
ments of the crime having been proved beyond a reasonable doubt,
but for not having risen to his own defense, which, of course, is no
crime.
We offer these arguments only in skeletal form, because they are only
of tangential import to the reasoning set forth in this paper. They are
important to our thesis to the extent that they render the use of any
presumption in a criminal case suspect in constitutional terms; the
more credence given to these arguments, the more suspect presump-
tions become. Mr. Justice Black, for example, finds the argument con-
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cerning the compulsion to testify against oneself enough to render
unconstitutional the operation of some presumptions.2-
One way in which such arguments have been met in the past is to
argue that if Congress or the legislature could constitutionally punish
individuals for commission of elements A and B, which remain to be
proved by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt, then the fact
that other elements are included in the definition of the crime and are
allowed or compelled to be inferred from the proven elements, is a
matter of legislative grace toward the defendant. At least under the
presumptive machinery, it is argued the defendant-even having com-
mitted A and B-is afforded a chance of escaping conviction, whereas
under a more narrowly defined statute, proof of A and B alone would
have resulted in conviction. This rationale, termed "the greater in-
cludes the lesser" rule, was postulated by Justice Holmes in Ferry v.
Ramsey.23
The Ferry case dealt with a Kansas statute that made bank directors
personally liable for losses to depositors on deposits made while the
bank was insolvent, if the bank director assented to the deposits with
knowledge of the insolvency. Proof of insolvency created a "presump-
tion" of knowledge. Actually, the device operated as an assumption,
since the burden of proving lack of knowledge rested on the defendant.
The presumptive language thus created an affirmative defense, but the
decision was written in language which would apply to presumptions
as well. Since the state could legally punish a bank director for un-
knowingly accepting deposits when the bank was insolvent, Holmes
reasoned, no injury occurred to the defendant in the working of the
presumption.
The Ferry case was not well reasoned. In our country, the almost
total elimination of common law crimes underscores a belief that the
decsion as to which actions will be criminally punishable can only be
made through the open political processes of the legislature. Consider
the following two statutes:
I. It shall be a crime for an individual to be present in a house
where he knows narcotics are illegally kept.
2. It shall be a crime for an individual to be present in a house
where narcotics are illegally kept, whether or not he kniows that
the narcotics are so kept.
22. See Justice Black's dissent in Gainey v. United States, 380 U.S. 63, 76-77 (1965).
23. 277 US. 88 (1928).
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In the first statute, a legislature has deemed three factors germane to
punishment: (a) presence of the individual; (b) the presence of narcotics
in the house; and (c) the defendant's knowledge. In the second statute,
only two factors are deemed germane to whether an individual will be
punished: (a) presence of the individual; (b) the presence of narcotics
in the house. The electorate might approve of the passage of the first
statute, but not the passage of the second. The fact that a legislature
might pass the second statute does not mean that, given the political
temperament of the state, the legislature would in fact have passed it.
If the legislature nominally recognizes knowledge as germane (as it
did in the first statute) and further, as the type of germane issue to be
proved by the state, and then arranges its processes so that most of
those who lack knowledge are still sent to jail (as though the second
statute had been passed), then those individuals are being punished
for a crime which has never undergone the political checks guaranteed
by representative government. This, we believe, is a violation of
due process. It is this latter consideration which the "greater in-
dudes the lesser" rule fails to consider and which, in our view, is its
major theoretical weakness.
In any case, we believe that Ferry v. Ramsey is no longer controlling
for the following reasons:
1. The rule in Ferry v. Ramsey has never been followed. It has
in no subsequent case been considered as a standard for testing
the constitutionality of a presumption or a defense.
2. The decision in Romano v. United States24 overrules Ferry,
at least as applied to presumptions in criminal cases.
In Romano, the court was confronted with a statute that punished
the possession of illegal alcohol distillery equipment. The statute, as
interpreted by the Court, contained a presumption that possession is
established when the government has successfully proved that the de-
fendant was present at the illicit distillery.2 The Court first held that
there was no rational connection between presence and possession,
expressly refusing to apply the "greater includes the lesser" rule:
It may be, of course, that Congress has the power to make presence
at an illegal still a punishable crime, but we find no clear indica-
tion that it intended to exercise this power. The crime remains
24. 882 US. 186 (1965).
25. The statute provided that proof of defendant's presence at the illicit distillery Is
"sufficient evidence to authorize conviction unless the defendant explains such presence
to the satisfaction of the jury." We would argue that this language may create an assump-
tion. See pp. 196, 203-205 infra.
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possession and not presence, and with all due deference to Con-
gress, the former may not constitutionally be inferred from the
latter .2
Thus, while recognizing that Congress might have had the power to
punish an individual merely for his presence at the still, the Court
nevertheless refused to allow this "greater power" to save the presump-
tion from infirmity. At least insofar as presumptive language in
criminal cases is concerned, the test in Romano is not whether the
greater offense might have been created, but whether or not the
offense as created is constitutionally acceptable.27
After Romano, the constitutional attacks enumerated above2s can-
not be dismissed as easily. Yet, notwithstanding the strong rhetorical
effect of these arguments, we must acknowledge that the presence of
presumptions as a part of our law antedated the founding of our na-
tion. This fact leaves three courses open to those sensitive to the
operation of presumptions against criminal defendants. The first path
is to argue that the initial tolerance for presumptions, as well as af-
firmative defenses, was a mistake which more refined notions of due
process now demand undoing. The second is to argue that the so-called
"traditional!' presumptions (and also affirmative defenses) are historical
accidents which cannot be undone, but that no analogous newly
created devices should be tolerated. Finally, we can seek to articulate
principles which will neither undo all of the past, nor freeze the
present development of such devices, but which will nevertheless
provide assurance that any presumption-past, present, or future-
will operate well within the demands of due process. We have chosen
the third course for a number of reasons. First, while we do not believe
that an absolute prohibition of, or "freeze" upon, presumptions would
now produce an unworkable disadvantage for state and federal gov-
ernments, we do believe that the possibility of unforeseeable future
developments in the relationship between the individual and the
state renders such an inflexible rule unwise. Second, we believe that
this approach, which is more in keeping with the spirit of our law, will
be more hospitably received by our courts. Indeed, if the principles
we set forth will truly satisfy the demands of due process-and with
26. 382 U.S. at 136, 144.
27. We would hope that the same rationale would be applied to defenses created
through specific legislation as well as through presumptive language. And we shall dis-
cuss this later. We can conceive of no reason why this should not be the case, for the
rights of the defendant should not be made to turn on the employment of the term
"presumption" in the creation of a defense.
28. See p. 176 supra.
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the passing of the "greater includes the lesser" rule, we believe this
is now possible-, any more absolutist approach amounts to "over-
kill." This we believe is the true significance of Romano. So long
as it might have been held that the state had the power to manipulate
the presumptive and assumptive devices in connection with a "lesser
offense" because it "had power to punish for the greater offense," any
test applied to the presumption or assumption was as much a "grace"
as the presumptive and assumptive devices which were in contention.
Now, standadrs can be formulated which, if accepted, will not be
short-circuited. The problem remains to formulate some test which
makes sense when viewed critically.
When dealing with presumptions which aid the prosecution against
a criminal defendant, the authors believe that one of the factors in
the comparative convenience test-the consideration of the prosecu-
torial difficulty in producing evidence on an issue-should be viewed
only as a threshold standard to determine whether there is some proper
state interest which legitimizes reliance upon presumptive devices. In
addition, we submit that the interest of the government should be con-
fined to the evidentiary problem of mustering proof and should not
extend to its zeal to control a given type of misconduct which is pro-
scribed by the criminal law. In other words, we see no justification for
the proposition that the government's interest, as contemplated here,
is stronger with respect to the prosecution of murder than the prosecu-
tion of petit theft. Our reasons for confining the state interest to an
assessment of its evidentiary hardship will become clear after we have
discussed two additional standards which we deem appropriate for the
scrutiny of presumptions.
While we approve this one leg of the comparative convenience test
as a threshold inquiry into the constitutionality of a presumption, we
believe that presumptions which pass this test may yet present serious
constitutional problems. Consider the two essential alterations in the
process of adjudication which are occasioned by the existence of a
presumption, which we repeat for convenience:
1. The presumption requires a defendant to come forth with
the evidence of not-C before he can enjoy the untrammeled jury
process, i.e., he must participate and perhaps testify himself.
2. If the defendant does not produce sufficient evidence of not-
C, he is deprived of the natural response of the jury to infer or not
to infer C from the proof of A and B, because the presumption re-
quires that C be deemed true automatically if the jury finds A
and B.
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We contend that these alterations may significantly increase impreci-
sion in the process of guilt determination. These alterations -will
produce no imprecision only if:
1. All innocent persons against whom A and B can be proved
will be able to produce sufficient evidence of not-C to overcome
the presumption; or
2. In all instances where A and B can be proved, C is also true
-that is, there is a 100% correlation between A-plus-B and C.
If the first condition is satisfied, the presumption will "drop out" of
the case as to innocent persons who have committed A and B but not
C. Once the presumption has been overcome, the prosecution must
prove C beyond a reasonable doubt; and the jury is free to find or not
to find C, just as though the presumption were not present. In this
part of the discussion, for the sake of simplicity, we assume a totally
accurate jury; therefore, free of the automatic determination of C
which the presumption requires, the jury will without error acquit
all those who have not committed C.20 Consequently, if this first con-
dition is satisfied, the accuracy of the guilt determining process will
not be altered as a result of the presence of the presumption.
Now let us assume that the first condition is not met, and that there
is at least one individual who has been found to have committed A
and B, who did not commit C, and who cannot produce sufficient ev-
idence of not-C to overcome the presumption. As to this individual,
the presumption remains in full force. C will automatically be deemed
proved. The jury is not free to separate those who actually committed
C from those who did not. Thus if there are any individuals for whom
A and B can be proved, but for whom C is not also true, and who
cannot overcome the presumption, these individuals will be wrongly
convicted. The only condition under which this will not occur is where
there are no persons for whom A and B are true but for whom C is
not true. This is merely a restatement of our second condition. Con-
ceptualized in another way, if there are any persons for whom A and B,
29. In this regard, the proponents of the ALI Model Penal Code rule might argue
that the presumption, as they administer it, is not subject to the same objections as when
the presumption requires an automatic determination of guilt. Under the Model Penal
Code, they might point out, the issue always goes to the jury. MODEL. PE.A CODE § 1.13
(rent. Draft No. 4, 1955). A totally accurate jury, which is free to find or not to find,
would invariably acquit those defendants for whom C is not true. We concede this. The
problem is, of course, that juries are not wholly accurate. As we hope to demonstrate
later, even juries that are usually accurate when no presumption is in operation are
likely to produce as many mistaken findings as a process of automatic determination
when they are laboring under the Model Penal Code instructions as to presumptions.
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but not C, are true, the presumption will work to convict all of them.
Without the presumption, a totally accurate jury would exonerate all
of the innocent, and a jury in the real world, subject to errors, would
exonerate at least some of them.30
Before examining the dynamics of the two conditions, we must first
determine what increased degree of imprecision the state can intro-
duce into its guilt-determining process before standards of due process
are violated. There is little in the Constituion to aid us in this deter-
mination. Shall we merely look to Justice Frankfurter's conscience?3"
Can we derive mileage from the aphorism that "it is better that one
hundred guilty men go unpunished than that one innocent man be
convicted"? We assume that some types of guilt determination-
for example, trial by a jury's flip of a coin-are not constitutional
because they are so inherently irrational as to the actual determination
of guilt or innocence that they might well result in the conviction of
large percentages of innocent persons. But no principles of constitu-
tional law will provide us with a mathematical yardstick; the answer
is necessarily a subjective one. The Supreme Court in Leary left this
question open when it said:
Since we find that the Section 176a presumption is unconstitu-
tional under this standard, we need not reach the question
whether a criminal presumption which passes muster when so
judged must also satisfy the criminal "reasonable doubt" standard
if proof of the crime charged or an essential element thereof de-
pends upon its use."
30. Up to now, we have assumed, for the sake of simplicity, a wholly accurate jury.
When we consider the situation as it really is, taking into account the possibility of
errors on the part of the jury, we find that the conditions under which presumptions
will produce no increased inaccuracy in the guilt-determining process are even more
restricted.
Assuming a jury which is sometimes wrong in its finding of A or B, a larger class of
innocent individuals will have to overcome the presumption. Therefore, in addition to
the factors mentioned above, we must assess the ability of those individuals wrongly
found to have committed A or B or both to overcome the presumption. Absent the
presumption, some of the innocent persons who have been wrongly found to have com-
mitted A or B or both might have "lucked out." Through an incorrect finding of not.C,
a jury might have reached the correct decision of acquittal. Therefore, assuming an In-
accurate jury, unless all of these individuals can overcome the presumption, more inno-
cent individuals will be convicted.
We shall for the remainder of the paper assume the rules which are appropriate to it
wholly accurate jury. To incorporate the variables entailed by an assumption of jury
inaccuracy requires a degree of refinement which, we believe, cannot realistically be
achieved. But let it not be said that we are getting away with anything. Under the more
realistic assumption of a jury subject to error, presumptions are even more imprecise and
the state's use of them all the more suspect.
31. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
32. Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 36 n.64 (1969).
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For the reasons discussed in this paper, we strenuously urge that the
question must be answered in the affirmative; and we submit that a
standard of precision approaching 99%, and certainly greater than
90%, should be required before a presumption can be constitutionally
sustained consistent with notions of due process. Percentages, al-
though not subject to precise determination, have a shorthand value
in suggesting analogous subjective limitations upon the acceptable
standard of imprecision, and the device of percentages will be so em-
ployed throughout the rest of this article.
With this in mind, let us determine how far short of the two con-
ditions set out above a presumption can fall and still operate within
the acceptable limits of imprecision. Assume that to be constitutional
a presumption must operate so that no greater than 5% of those con-
victed pursuant to it may be innocent.s If nine out of ten persons who
committed A and B also committed C, and if nine out of ten persons
who commifted A and B, but who have not committed C, can success-
fully overcome the presumption, then, assuming no inaccuracies in
the jury process, under a presumption of C, out of every 100 pros-
ecutions in which A and B have been found true, one innocent
person together with 90 guilty persons will be convicted. Nine in-
nocent persons will be able successfully to overcome the presump-
tion. The conviction of one innocent person in 91 entails an imprecision
of approximately 1.1%. Under these circumstances, the presumption
might be held to be constitutional. But if only seven out of ten per-
sons who committed A and B also committed C, and if only seven out
of ten persons who have committed A and B, but who have not com-
mitted C, can successfully overcome the presumption, then, under
the same conditions, out of 100 prosecutions in which A and B are
proved, there will be 79 convictions, nine of which will involve inno-
cent persons. Here there is a wrongful conviction rate of approximately
11.4%. Here the presumption should be held unconstitutional.3
3. This would seem to us to be a rather lax standard, for the authors 'would not
really be satisfied if 50 of every 1000 people in our prisons were innocent, but it will do
for purposes of illustration.
34. We have assumed that the jury determinations will be accurate. In formulating
the two indices of imprecision, we noted that this assumption proved to be a boon to the
state, in that it made the presumptive devices seem more accurate than they actually were,
supra note S0. But this assumption may not operate in the same way here where we are
measuring the acceptable limits of imprecision. What, for example, if 11.47 of the
persons convicted are always innocent? If this is so, then it might be that some of the
persons convicted under the presumption would have been convicted anyway; and there-
fore the existence of the presumption may not have introduced an imprecision as high as
11.4%. If the correlation is exact, an unlikely coincidence, it would not introduce any
imprecision beyond that of the untrammeled jury process.
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We have discovered that we cannot achieve even a rough sense of
the magnitude of the imprecision until we ask two different questions:
1. What percentage of innocent persons, subject to the pre-
sumption, will be able to overcome it? and
2. What is the correlation between the incidence of "A and B"
and "C"?
It should also be noted that these two questions are similar to two
standards already in use by the courts as discussed above. The second
one is analogous to the rational connection test. The first is analogous
to the second leg of the comparative convenience test, inasmuch as it
inquires into the ease with which defendants can muster proof. How-
ever, it differs from the comparative convenience test in that it does
not measure the propriety of imposing burdens upon the defendant
against the burden lifted from the state. Rather it measures the pro-
priety of the burden solely in terms of the risk of wrongful conviction
which is imposed upon the defendant regardless of the hardship im-
posed upon the state. The difference is more than a technical one. It
goes to the very manner in which the standards are employed.
The very existence of the rational connection test indicates that the
Supreme Court has been concerned with the precision with which pre-
sumptions operate. However, it has provided us with very little from
which to infer what is meant by a "rational connection." As we have
previously discussed3 5 what the Court calls a rational connection be-
tween two elements in one case may not suffice as a rational connection
in a similar case if the presumptive language is applied differently.
The presumption of negligence in Turnipseed was held to be rational;
the assumption of negligence in Henderson was not. The defect in the
A number of factors militate for the assumption that the inaccuracies in the jury
system may simply be ignored. First, there is the aspect of simplicity in formulating
standards. Second, in view of the standard of "proof beyond a reasonable doubt," and
the requirement of unanimity in most jurisdictions, it is not unreasonable to assume that
the imprecision of the jury leads to few wrongful convictions. Third, there is something
disconcerting in the argument that a given process which the government is imposing
upon individuals is not objectionable because the one that the government is taking
away from them might conceivably be as bad. Fourth, when we demand due process,
we are striving toward an ideal of fair dealing. If and when the jury system proves to
convict too high a percentage of innocent persons, there will be time enough to consider
whether due process demands a fairer procedure at the option of the criminal defendant.
Until the government is prepared to stand for all purposes upon the proposition that
the jury system is so inaccurate that it consistently convicts a high percentage of innocent
persons, and to face all the consequences of that alarming position, then it-as well as Its
citizens-should be held to the useful fiction (if it is a fiction) that the jury, if It Is
properly instructed and the trial is properly administered, will only in rare instances
wrongly convict innocent persons.
35. See pp. 166-67 supra.
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assumptive device in Henderson was not that the connection between
accident and negligence was irrational; the problem was that, although
there was a rational connection in Henderson, it was not a sufficiently
strong rational connection to justify the burden which was being im-
posed upon the defendant. There is nothing magical about a "rational
connection"-it can represent a positive correlation as low as 50+%
between the fact presumed and the fact proved. Even with such a low
correlation betwveen X and Y as 50.0001% (if that is all the information
one has) the only rational conclusion one can reach given that X has
occurred, is that Y also has occurred. At long last, in Leary, the Su-
preme Court has affirmed this proposition.ao
Once the strength of the rational connection between X and Y is
measured, the question of whether the connection is sufficiently strong
to warrant a particular legal result cannot be answered by staring at
the rational connection again or jockeying the figures or renaming
it an "irrational connection" instead. One must ask what kind of pro-
cedural hardship is imposed upon the defendant against whom the
presumption (or assumption) runs. We might, for example, feel cause
for alarm in learning that the rational connection between A-plus-B
and C of the elements of a crime is a rational connection of only
51%, until we also discover that only one innocent person in a billion
would have trouble overcoming the presumption of C. Conversely, a
rational connection of 85% between A-plus-B and C may make us
feel comfortable, until we learn that no one innocent of C will be
able to overcome the presumption of C. Our courts cannot properly
perform their finction of safeguarding criminal defendants from the
operation of presumptions which violate due process by relying upon
a rational connection test alone. The attempt to do so has necessitated
warping the concept of a rational connection so as to take into account
the burdens imposed upon defendants, which generally have nothing
to do with the incidence of correlation between elements.
A court must direct its attention to both questions set out above.37
36. 595 U.S. 6 (1969).
37. At a very early stage in its consideration of the problems of presumptions, even
before the rational connection test was formulated, the Supreme Court seemed inclined
to direct its inquiry concerning the precision of the operation of presumptions somewhat
along the line we suggest here. In Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904), when dealing
ivth a presumption that allowed use of illegal gambling devices to be inferred from pos-
session of the devices, the Court noted: "Innocent persons would have no trouble in ex-
plaining the possession of these tickets, and in any event the possession is only prima lade
evidence.... 192 U.S. at 599. While we favor inquiry into the evidentiary hardship
incurred by the state as a threshold test for determining whether there is suilident com-
pelling interest to warrant further consideration of the presumption, we hope, for reasons
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In answering the second question only certain factors are relevant. It is
relevant to consider the kind of evidence which is being demanded of
the defendant to overcome the presumption. Does it involve personal
knowledge? Does it call for records which he can reasonably be ex-
pected to produce? It is also relevant to examine how much evidence
is required of the defendant. To answer this question, the court must
not only read the statute, it must also ascertain how the presumption is
administered. The more evidence required of the defendant to over-
come the presumption, the fewer the number of innocent defendants
able to overcome the presumption; and therefore, the higher the ra-
tional connection must be. One thing not relevant in this inquiry is
whether the defendant's burden is five or five thousand times lighter
than that lifted from the prosecution. The percentage of innocent
defendants that will be convicted pursuant to a presumption will in
no way be affected by the difficulty which the prosecution might have
in proving its case absent the presumption. The question of the diffi-
culty which the prosecution might have in proving the presumed ele-
ment is relevant to the judicial scrutiny of presumptions, but only in
establishing the government's interest in relying upon the presumption
in the first place.
By speaking in comparative terms, the court should not allow itself
to stray into a balancing process involving elements which should not
be balanced. To allow the government's interest to control the ac-
ceptable level of imprecision occasioned by the presumption is to lose
sight of the meaning of that interest. The interest of the government
is in proving that guilty persons are guilty; its interest is not simply
in winning cases. The governmental interest in acquitting the innocent
cannot be subordinated to its interest in convicting the guilty.
IV. The Effect of Assumptions in the Light of Due Process
The effect of the creation of an assumption of the element , of the
crime whose elements were defined above as A, B and C, is to redefine
the crime to include only elements A and B and to render the proof
of not-C an affirmative defense which the defendant must prove to a
preponderance of the evidence or some other standard. Laboring un-
der an assumption of C, the criminal defendant is confronted with a
that will become apparent, that when the Court assesses the degree of imprecision caused
by a presumption it will return to the principle set forth in Adars v, Now York and
confine its inquiry to the hardship incurred by the defendant.
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more onerous task than if he were merely laboring under a presump-
tion of C. Under a presumption of C the defendant merely has to intro-
duce some evidence tending to show not-C which will be deemed suf-
ficient to overcome the presumption, and, under a true presumption,
the amount of evidence necessary to overcome the presumption will
never amount to proof of not-C. It follows that there will be a higher
number of innocent defendants convicted under an assumption of C
than under a presumption of C. Since the kinds of protection we have
attempted to create against the operation of presumptions could be
totally circumvented if the legislature could, in all cases in which C
is an admittedly germane issue, constitutionally create an assumption
of C in lieu of a presumption of C, the government should not be
able to create an assumption of C unless, under the rules we have for-
mulated, it could create a presumption of C.
Accepting that this rule is proper where the creation of the affir-
mative defense is an obvious attempt to accomplish with an assumption
what could not be accomplished with a presumption, it might never-
theless be argued that, for the "traditional" kinds of affirmative de-
fenses and for affirmative defenses that do not seem "devious," a com-
plex set of rules drawn with an eye to presumptions should not be
grafted upon the jurisprudence of affirmative defenses without a more
exhaustive analysis of affirmative defenses. We accept this point, and
will proceed accordingly.
In creating the tests for presumptions, we found it helpful to ex-
amine how the existence of a presumption altered the guilt deter-
mining process. This same approach does not, at first, seem appropriate
when dealing with assumptions. With presumptions, we were con-
fronted with crimes defined by elements A, B and C. There is asso-
ciated with each element a prosecutorial burden of persuasion and
a jury process of adjudication, which the existence of the pre-
sumption could be seen to "alter." With assumptions, we have crimes
defined only by elements A and B; not-C is an affirmative defense.
Viewed in this manner, there is no "alteration in the guilt determining
process" with which to take issue. The prosecution still must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt each of the elements of the crime; no pre-
sumption makes the task easier. The defendant is afforded the "grace"
of being allowed to interpose a "defense" which, of course, he must
prove. Schematically, nothing could be more traditional and benign.
Viewing the defense as a "grace," however, begs the question. It
can be a burden as well. Few people will question the constitution-
ality of "self-defense" as an affirmative defense to murder. On the
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other hand, we would strenuously protest the legislature's creating the
capital crime of "possessing a firearm" together with the affirmative
defense of "non-murder." Similarly, the Supreme Court, in discussing
presumptions and the relative convenience test, noted in Tot:
In every criminal case the defendant has at least an equal famil-
iarity with the facts and in most a greater familiarity with them
than the prosecution. It might, therefore, be argued that to place
upon all defendants in criminal cases the burden of going forward
with the evidence would be proper. But the argument proves too
much. If it were sound, the legislature might validly command
that the finding of an indictment, or mere proof of the identity of
the accused, should create a presumption of the existence of all
the facts essential to guilt. This is not permissibleas
But why is it impermissible? What are the principles behind Mr. Justice
Harlan's flat statement? Some mileage can be obtained by invoking
tradition and history. Proof of murder is traditionally the burden of
the prosecution; proof of self-defense is traditionally the burden of the
defendant. But again, is there is a principle behind the tradition?
Have we no other recourse than the subjective voltmeter which mea-
sures the shock on Frankfurter's conscience to divine which defenses
are legislative "graces" and which are unconstitutional burdens?
We have also to address ourselves to the "greater includes the lesser"
rule, which, it might be argued, has a continuing vitality in the area
of affirmative defenses since the Romano case has only discredited it
with regard to presumptions. As applied to affirmative defenses, the
"greater includes the lesser" rule runs as follows: If the government
can punish for the crime without providing the affirmative defense,
then the existence of the defense cannot render the power to punish
for the offense any less certain. It can be argued that, in Romano, what
the Court refused to allow was a "redefinition" of the crime. But, with
affirmative defenses, the government has already redefined the crime,
Take for example our firearm statute. What if Congress itself defines
the crime to be "possession of a firearm" and makes non-murder an
affirmative defense? Now the Court would have no redefining with
which to trouble itself. If Romano stands for no more than a refusal
to sanction the "redefinition" of a substantive crime by the Court,
does it not follow that "non-murder" is a perfectly proper affirmative
defense to the crime of possession of a firearm? Why stop there? There
are a whole string of graciously legislated affirmative defenses which
38. Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 469 (1943).
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could be afforded to lucky criminal defendants charged with the crime
of "possession of a firearm, instrument of violence, or burglary tools":
non-robbery, non-assault, non-rape, non-kidnaping, non-burglary, etc.
These affirmative defenses, we submit, are constitutionally unac-
ceptable. We believe that the principles of Romano, when read in the
light of the arguments below, are as applicable to affirmative defenses
as to presumptions. To begin our argument, let us return to the con-
cept of "germaneness," which we developed above.39 In the area of
criminal law, generally it is for the legislative branch of the govern-
ment to decide what is germane. It codifies its decisions by defining
elements of a crime and by setting out affirmative defenses. Sometimes
the courts define germane issues by "reading in" defenses (e.g., insan-
ity) or by modifying the elements of the crime (e.g., requiring scienter
for some crimes). By rendering issues either elements of a crime or
affirmative defenses, legislatures and courts distribute burdens of per-
suasion and risks of non-persuasion.
In passing a criminal statute, three decisions must be made:
1. What issues must be resolved one way or another before an
individual is to be punished; i.e., what issues are germane to pun-
ishment.
2. Who shall bear the burden of persuasion as to issues; i.e.,
what assumption shall be made with regard to each germane issue.
3. What presumptions, if any, shall be made with regard to each
germane issue?40
When a legislature defines a crime to include elements A, B and C,
which the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, and
provides for no affirmative defenses, it is making two of the types of
decisions set out above:
1. It is proclaiming that the issues of whether A, B and C are
true are the germane issues as to whether an individual will be
punished, and
2. It is assuming that not-A, not-B and not-C are true until the
prosecution proves otherwise.
When the legislature defines the crime to constitute only A and B,
and renders X an affirmative defense, it makes the same types of de-
cisions.
39. See p. 171 supra.
40. In setting forth these decisions, we have omitted the question of what burdens
of pleading or introducing evidence will be imposed upon which parties except, of course,
the burden of introducing evidence, which is invariably imposed upon the party against
whom a presumption operates.
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Let us now examine the parallels between presumptions and as-
sumptions in order to demonstrate why rules analogous to those for-
mulated for presumptions should be applied to assumptions. The
second and third rules for scrutinizing presumptions were geared
toward determining what percentage of innocent persons would be
convicted as a result of the presumption. If too great a percentage of
those convicted because of the presumption were innocent, the pre-
sumption was found to be a violation of due process. Similarly, when
we are called upon to sanction a legal device called an assumption,
which simply assumes that a fact is true, we must ask whether the use
of that device will result in the conviction of an unacceptably high
percentage of innocent defendants. With presumptions, we found that
the question could not be answered unless we asked two further
questions:
1. What percentage of innocent defendants can successfully
overcome the presumption; and
2. What is the rational connection, or correlation, between the
facts proved and the facts presumed.
Analogous questions are necessary for assumptions. When the legisla-
ture defines a crime by elements A and B and renders X an affirmative
defense, thereby assuming A, B, and not-X, we must ask:
1. What percentage of innocent defendants can successfully
prove X; and
2. What is the rational connection or correlation between "A
and B" and "not-X."
If, under this law, only seven out of ten innocent individuals can prove
X, and if not-X correlates with "A and B" only 70% of the time, the
law will include nine innocent persons in every 79 convictions. In other
words, 11.4% of those convicted will be innocent. We will not trouble
the reader with another long mathematical analysis; it would merely
be a rerun of our discussion of presumptions.
One distinction, however, between assumption and presumption
must be noted. The burden imposed upon the defendant in proving an
affirmative defense of X to a preponderance of the evidence will always
be greater than the burden of coming forward with evidence sufficient
to overcome a presumption of X. This means that fewer innocent
defendants will be able to sustain the burden imposed by an assump-
tion than that imposed by a presumption. Therefore, in order to ob-
tain the same precision in guilt determination, given equal ability to
produce evidence on the part of defendants, the correlation between
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the proof of the elements of the crime and the negative of the affirma-
tive defense must always be stronger than the correlation demanded
between the facts proved and the facts presumed under a presumption.
This principle, which is the basis for the rule of thumb test put forth
at the outset of our discussion of assumptions, also provides a rational
basis for the differing results in Henderson and Turnipseed.4 '
There is yet another reason for desiring a stronger rational connec-
tion with regard to assumptions than we demand for presumptions-a
reason which is independent of our scrutiny of the imprecision of the
guilt determining process. The criminal law should be scrutinized not
only from the point of view of protecting innocent defendants against
wrongful conviction. The principles implicit in the term "probable
cause" require us also to provide reasonable protections against the
arrest and trial of innocent persons. Arrest, temporary incarceration,
the posting of bond or the purchase of bail bond, and the cost of de-
fending oneself are undeniable hardships. Nor can we take lightly the
sense of human dignity which is all too often injured in the process.
It is naive to look toward civil remedies as effective means of re-
dressing such injuries. We believe, therefore, that there is an acute
interest in not condoning a law which allows the arrest of large num-
bers of innocent persons, absent some clearly overriding state interest.
The crime should be defined so that arrests pursuant to it apprehend
a body of individuals the vast majority of whom will be found guilty
if the elements of the crime are proved. Conversely, the definition of
the crime should not be such that large numbers of persons arrested
thereunder will ultimately be shown to fall into one or more of the
various exceptions established by the creation of affirmative defenses.
41. See pp. 166-67 supra. At first blush, there might seem to be an objection to our
characterization that assumptions are always harder on defendants than presumptions. This
argument is as follows: In the case of an assumption of not-X, such that the proof of X
is an affirmative defense, the defendant's evidence of X always goes directly to the jury;
whereas in the case of a presumption of C, the judge must decide whether the defen.
dant's evidence of not-C is sufficient to overcome the presumption, before allowing the
evidence of not-C to go to the jury. Thus an assumption of non-X is more favorable
to the defendant; a presumption may operate so as never to allow the defendant's evi-
dence of not-C to reach the jury. This advantage, however, is rather illusory. If the
defendant has sufficient evidence to prove not-C to a preponderance of the evidence
(which he must do to win when an assumption is operating against him), he will in-
variably have sufficient evidence to overcome a presumption of C. Having overcome the
presumption, he will not only have his evidence of not-C reach the jury, but will also
enjoy the advantage of having the burden of proving C beyond a reasonable doubt rest
with the prosecution. In other words, any defendant who can win against the operation
of an assumption could have won against the operation of a presumption. But some
individuals who can win against the operation of a presumption cannot win against the
operation of an assumption.
42. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656-58 (1961).
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Expressed in terms of our letter notation, we can say that a crime is
properly defined by elements A and B only if, with few exceptions,
individuals who have been found to have committed A and B are
guilty. If proof of X is an affirmative defense to the commission of A
and B, then given the truth of A and B, not-X should be true as a
general rule. This paradigm, which is merely a rephrasing of the con-
dition requiring a rational connection between the elements of the
crime which are to be proved and the negative of the affirmative de-
fense, must be followed if arrests are to fall primarily upon the guilty.
It should be noted that, for the purposes of avoiding the arrest of a
disproportionate number of innocent persons, it is irrelevant whether
there is a high or a low percentage of innocent defendants that can
successfully prove the affirmative defense.
There is a third reason, independent of the protection against
wrongful conviction and the protection against wrongful arrest, which
requires a rational connection. A strong rational connection between
the elements of the crime and the negative of the affirmative defense
is necessary to prevent the criminal process from becoming an accusa-
torial proceeding where proof is largely a matter of the exculpatory
efforts of the defendant. If the prosecution's proof of A and B still
leaves in doubt whether large numbers of defendants fall within the
factual setting which the state has deemed punishable, then much of
the proof in the case will have to be provided by the defendant. Absent
sufficient control over the creation of such defenses, the legislature is
free to impose upon criminal defendants an inquisitorial system for.
eign to our notions of due process. As before, the strength of the
rational connection that might be desired here is not dependent on
the percentage of innocent defendants who can prove the affirmative de-
fense; the success of even a very high number of defendants in proving
the defense does not render the system less inquisitorial.
We have shown that there is a greater potential danger to the rightg
of individuals from the use of assumptions than from the use of pre-
sumptions for the following reasons:
1. Assumptions impose a higher evidentiary burden and a higher
risk of wrongful conviction upon a criminal defendant than do
presumptions.
2. Assumptions pose the treat of occasioning the arrest and trial
of a high number of innocent persons.
3. Assumptions pose the threat of turning a prosecutorial sys-
tem into an inquisitorial system.
The second and third reasons are applicable to presumptions as well,
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but to a lesser degree. For these reasons, the creation of an assumption
should require a stronger state interest in terms of the difficulty of
producing evidence than was required for the creation of a presump-
tion. As with presumptions, the determination of the state interest
should be a threshold determination which antecedes the complex and
subjective process of assessing the imprecision introduced into the guilt
determining process and the potential for wrongful arrests which is
occasioned by the existence of the assumption.
V. An Unanswered Question: Is a "Rational Connection"
Still Necessary?
Implicit in our mathematical consideration of presumptions and
assumptions is the principle that under our rules some presumptions
might be constitutionally sustained even though there is less than a
rational connection between the facts proved and the facts presumed.
Similarly, some assumptions might be sustained without a rational
connection between the proof of the elements of the crime and the
negative of the affirmative defense. What if, for example, all innocent
defendants could overcome the evidentiary burden imposed upon
them? Or what if only one innocent defendant in a million would fail
to sustain the burden imposed by the presumption or the assumption?
In such instances, rational connections very much lower than 51%
might not result in a wrongful conviction rate in excess of 2%. Shall
we then not require a "rational connection" but merely an "inferen-
tial connection" strong enough to render the presumption or assump-
tion sufficiently precise as an instrument for the determination of
guilt? We believe that our analysis logically allows such a result.
An argument may be made, however, for requiring a rational
connection regardless of the precision of the operation of the pre-
sumption or assumption. First, the requirement that the acts for which
an individual may be arrested and the elements which the state must
prove must more often than not be dispositive of an individual's guilt
is a guarantee that our criminal procedure will not assume the charac-
teristics of an inquisitorial system. Second, if the requirement of a
rational connection were eliminated, the constitutional test might be-
come so vague in the minds of some judges that it would be very
difficult to administer. The natural propensity of judges to uphold
legislative acts might then result in the retention of many unnecessary
and undesirable presumptive devices. We believe that most indi-
viduals, including judges, make decisions on a "more likely than not"
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basis. The continued requirement of a rational connection puts judges
on naturally firm footing. Third, at the other extreme, some judges
might occasionally be tempted to attribute more precision to our
tests than the process of human inference can produce. The calculus
we have suggested clearly has many subjective and impressionistic
elements. In most cases, judges will be doing well to create three
or four workable categories of inferential connection. The require-
ment of a bare rational connection, regardless of other considera-
tions, provides a means of cutting down the number of presumptive
devices for which a calculation of the ability of defendants to produce
sufficient evidence, a difficult determination, must be made. Fourth,
presumptive and assumptive devices may force defendants, unable
to produce other proof, to come to their own defense. The requirement
of a rational connection guarantees that, even as to a defendant who
chooses to stand mute, it is at least more likely than not that he is
guilty.43
VI. The Effect of Rules of Application on the Validity
of Presumptive Language Under Due Process
In our comparison of the Turnipseed and Henderson cases, 44 we
found that two different jurisdictions might utilize presumptions with
similar wording, and yet treat them quite differently. In order for us
to have some idea of the range of differences which we might encounter
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, we shall examine in some detail three
of the approaches to the application of presumptive language which
Morgan found to be most commonly employed in U.S. jurisdictions. 46
1. The existence of the presumed fact must be assumed unless
and until evidence has been introduced which would justify a
jury in finding the non-existence of the presumed fact. When such
evidence has been introduced, the existence or non-existence of
the presumed fact is to be determined exactly as if no presump-
tion had ever been operative in the action; indeed, as if no such
concept as a presumption had ever been known to the courts.
Whether the judge or the jury believes or disbelieves the op-
posing evidence thus introduced is entirely immaterial. This may
43. The authors have been unable to agree on what ultimate stand to take on this
question.
EVIDENcE 729 (1965).
44. See pp. 166-67 supra.
45. Morgan, Foreword to MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 55 (1942).
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be called the pure Thayer rule, for if he did not invent it, he first
clearly expounded it.
2. The existence of the presumed fact must be assumed unless
and until the evidence of its non-existence convinces the jury that
its non-existence is at least as probable as its existence. This is
sometimes expressed as requiring evidence which balances the
presumption.
3. The existence of the presumed fact must be assumed unless
and until the jury finds that the non-existence of the presumed
fact is more probable than its existence. In other words, the pre-
sumption puts upon the party alleging the non-existence of the
presumed fact both the burden of producing evidence and the
burden of persuasion as to its non-existence. This is sometimes
called the Pennsylvania rule.
We will apply each rule to the same presumptive formulation, taking
for example a presumption of non-registration arising from the clan-
destine possession of a whiskey still, such as was upheld in Rossi v.
United States.46
Under the first, or Thayer rule, if the defendant introduces any
evidence of registration which if believed by the jury would justify a
finding of registration, the issue would go to the jury for determina-
tion. This approach preserves the inferential power of the clandestine
possession, the fact proved. The prosecution cannot generally suffer
dismissal if no additional evidence of non-registration is submitted,
since the jury would usually be justified in finding non-registration
from clandestine possession. The jury performs all the natural pro-
cesses which juries perform in weighing opposing evidence and cred-
ibility. The burden of producing evidence is shifted by the presump-
tion, but the burden of persuasion remains upon the prosecution, and
the quantum of proof attached to it remains unchanged: proof beyond
a reasonable doubt.
Under the second approach, the introduction of evidence by the
defendant which would justify a finding of registration would also be
enough to escape a mandatory finding of non-registration and send the
issue to the jury. However, the jury would be instructed that, in
order to return a finding of registration, it must find registration at
least as probable as non-registration. Thus non-registration need only
be more likely than registration, a standard which is what is usually
referred to as "proof to a preponderance of the evidence." The second
rule shifts the burden of producing evidence to the defendant, leaves
46. 289 U.S. 89 (1933).
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the burden of persuasion on the prosecution, but reduces the standard
of proof required on this issue to proof to a preponderance of the ev-
idence.
Under the third rule, the quantum of proof necessary to send the
issue to the jury is the same: evidence which would support a finding
of registration. However, the effect of the third rule is to place the
burden of persuasion on the defendant. Under our definitions, when
the third rule is applied to presumptive language, the presumption
operates as an assumption, and creates an affirmative defense.
It should be apparent that as each successive rule is applied to
the same language, the hardship on the defendant is increased. All
things being equal, an increasing number of innocent defendants
would be convicted by the application of each successive rule. There-
fore, by the rules which we have established, a stronger rational con-
nection and/or a greater ability of innocent defendants to produce
what is required to overcome the presumption would be necessary
under each successive rule to sustain the operation of the presumptive
language.
Two additional methods exist for applying presumptive language in
criminal cases. In fact, they are probably the methods most commonly
employed in criminal trials. The first approach is that of the ALl
Model Penal Code; the second we will call the California approach,
since we have taken our statement of it from an article dealing with
California practice.
The ALl Model Penal Code, Tentative Draft No. 4, contains two
separate statements on presumptions:
1. The majority view:
Presumptions.
(5) When the Code establishes a presumption with respect to
any fact which is an element of an offense, it has the following
consequences:
(a) when there is evidence of the facts which give rise to the
presumption, the issue of the existence of the presumed fact
must be submitted to the jury, unless the Court is satisfied that
the evidence as a whole clearly negatives the presumed fact; and
(b) when the issue of the existence of the presumed fact is
submitted to the jury, the Court shall charge that while the
presumed fact must, on all the evidence, be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt, the law declares that the jury may regard the
facts giving rise to the presumption as sufficient evidence of
the presumed fact.
2. The minority view:
Alternative (5): When the Code establishes a presumption with
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respect to any fact which is an element of an offense, it has the
following consequences:
(a) in the absence of evidence to the contrary of the presumed
fact, such fact shall be treated as established by the proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt of the facts which give rise to the pre-
sumption; and
(b) when there is evidence to the contrary of the presumed
fact, the issue must be submitted to the jury unless, giving
weight to the facts which give rise to the presumption and to
the legislative finding that such facts, standing alone, are in
general strong evidence of the presumed fact, the Court is satis-
fied that the evidence as a whole clearly negatives the presumed
fact; and
(c) when the issue of the existence of the presumed fact is
submitted to the jury, the Court shall charge that while the pre-
sumed fact must on all the evidence be proved beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, the law declares that the facts giving rise to the
presumption, standing alone, are in general strong evidence of
the presumed fact.47
It is necessary to analyze the dynamics of the ALI statements, ap-
plied in practice, so that we can compare the results likely to be pro-
duced with the results of other approaches to the administration of
presumptive language. We will use the Thayer approach as our stan-
dard of comparison, since it is the most lenient approach which we
have thus far analyzed, and is therefore the least suspect constitution-
ally under the principles we have elaborated.
Let us again consider a crime defined by the elements A, B and C,
and the presumption that, "if A and B are proved, C is presumed
true." Under the Thayer rule, if the defendant does not overcome the
presumption by the introduction of evidence which would support a
finding contra, the presumption requires that the proof of A and B
beyond a reasonable doubt shall cause C "to be treated as established
by proof beyond a reasonable doubt." If, on the other hand, the de-
fendant overcomes the presumption by submitting evidence which
would support a finding against the presumption, the presumption
drops out of the case, and the prosecution is left to prove C beyond a
reasonable doubt as though no presumption had existed.
The application of the ALI minority position reaches exactly the
same result as the Thayer rule when no evidence overcoming the pre-
sumption is introduced by the defendant. However, the ALI minority
47. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
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rule is more severe on the criminal defendant than the Thayer rule
if such evidence is forthcoming. Under the ALI minority rule, the jury
will be charged that "while the presumed fact must on all the evidence
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the law declares that the facts
giving rise to the presumption standing alone are in general strong
enough evidence of the presumed fact." Such instructions comment
very favorably on the inferential weight of the evidence tending to
establish C, and obviously will result in increasing the jury's disposi-
tion to find C. Under the Thayer rule, such a comment would not
be forthcoming and, indeed, in many jurisdictions would be improper.
Since the ALI minority position is the Thayer approach with the
additional hardship to the defendant of a comment favorable to the
prosecution on its evidence, it will result in a greater number of con-
victions of innocent defendants than the straight Thayer approach.
Let us now consider the ALI majority position under circumstances
where the defendant has not submitted any evidence in opposition to
the presumption. Although this position was drafted so as to aid de-
fendants by insuring that all issues get to the jury, we believe that it
is harder on defendants than the Thayer approach. It is, therefore,
more difficult to sustain under a due process attack when applied to
any given presumptive language. Arguably, when the ALI majority
approach is used, the standards of rational connection need not be
stronger than the barest positive correlation, since the issue of C is not
determined automatically, as under the other approaches, but is in-
variably allowed to go to the jury. At least in theory, the jury is free
to find or not to find C. Our lines of reasoning may be inappropriate
under such circumstances, since we based our argument on the im-
precision produced in guilt determination by a presumption which
operates automatically against a defendant who, though otherwise
innocent because of the non-existence of C, cannot overcome the pre-
sumption. But will the ALI majority rule, taking all cases into account,
produce fewer wrongful convictions than the "automatic" rule? To
make that assessment, we must undertake some speculation on the
effect of the ALI majority rule instructions on the jury.
The ALI instructions are somewhat confusing when analyzed care-
fully. They contain two distinct propositions: that the jury must be
convinced of C beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the law recog-
nizes the facts proved as sufficient to allow the inference of C beyond
a reasonable doubt. Jurors want to arrive at a just verdict. Generally
they are not certain as to what is meant by certainty "beyond a reason-
able doubt." We believe that the very force and value of this terni
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springs from this uncertainty on the part of jurors. The decisions of fact
which most individuals make in everyday life are generally based on
what is more likely than not. Will it rain? Will the stock market go
up or down? The term "beyond a reasonable doubt" is just difficult
enough to comprehend as a concept to break through this everyday
behavioral pattern of decision-making standards. More important, it
forces the individual juror to ponder the question of how the law
wants him to decide, and to examine his own soul, so to speak, to
answer the question of whether or not he is as sure as the law requires
him to be. It is intended to make even the juror who thinks that the
defendant "did it," in everyday terms, think twice.
Under the ALI majority instructions, however, the jury knows one
thing for certain that it usually does not know, a factor which may
seriously reduce the impact of the requirement of "proof beyond a
reasonable doubt." They know that the facts proved constitute suf-
ficient evidence in the eyes of the law to justify a finding of the fact
presumed beyond a reasonable doubt. We believe that a jury, having
found A and B, and having been informed that a finding of C is cor-
rect in the eyes of the law, will quite naturally look to see if there is
any reason not to find C. If there is no evidence which tends to show
not-C, they will all but inevitably find C. Thus, while it is true that
under the instructions the jury must decide that C has been proven
beyond a reasonable doubt or else find not-C, the instructions have
left no doubt in their minds that C is a correct result. Thus, all things
being equal, we do not see how the operation of the ALI majority rule
can realistically be expected to convict fewer innocent defendants than
the Thayer rule.
Let us now consider the case where the defendant has overcome the
presumption by submitting evidence of not-C. As noted, under the
Thayer approach the presumption ceases to have any effect on the trial.
The prosecution must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt; no
instructions favoring a finding of C are given. Under the ALI rule,
however, the same instructions are given as where there is no over-
coming evidence, and we believe that the jury experiences the same
psychological effect. The majority instructions do not merely favor a
finding of C, as do the minority ALI instructions. The minority in-
struction merely calls the evidence tending to show C "strong evi-
dence"; the majority informs the jury that C is without doubt a correct
result. Consequently, we believe that when the defendant can overcome
the presumption, the majority position will result in more wrongful
convictions than either the Thayer or ALI minority approaches.
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Now let us consider the California approach:
When by statute or rule of law a presumption is available to the
prosecution to prove an element of crime in a criminal proceed-
ing, the jury shall be told that, if they believe that the basic facts
of the presumption are proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the
law permits them to find that the presumed fact has also been
proved beyond a reasonable doubt, unless there is contrary ev-
idence which raises in their minds a reasonable doubt of the ex-
istence of the presumed fact.48
This approach is quite similar to that of the majority ALI position.
Under both rules, the jury is told that a finding of the presumed fact
will be proper. In addition, the California instructions state expressly
what we intuited would be the result of telling the jury that a finding
of C is proper: the jury is to look to the defendant to persuade it to
find a result other than that which the law deems proper. Under these
express instructions, a burden of persuasion is imposed upon the de-
fendants. In our terms the presumption has been transformed into an
assumption. The burden upon the defendant, however, is not so great
as to require him to prove that not-C is more likely than not-i.e., to
prove not-C to a preponderance of the evidence-but rather only that
there is a reasonable doubt as to the truth of C.
But can we really call this a burden of persuasion? Present here, as
with the ALI approach, is the strange "permissive" attitude to the jury
which has been called a "permissible inference."' 0 Let us assume that
an issue X is germane to the outcome of a case. Normally, the jury
will be instructed that if the party which has the burden of persuasion
fails to meet that burden to the required degree of certainty, it is the
duty of the jury to find not-X; if the party does sustain the burden of
persuasion, it is the duty of the jury to find X. Under the permissible
inference doctrine, all reference to duty and related notions mysteri-
ously disappear. Instead, as the California instruction indicates, unless
the defendant meets his burden of persuasion, the law permits the
jury to find the presumed fact. The same principle is in operation
under the ALI rule, where the jury is told that they "may regard the
facts giving rise to the presumption as sufficient evidence of the pre-
sumed fact." We intuit from the use of such language a libertarian fear
48. CALIuoiIA LAW REVISION CoMMISsION, TENTATIVE: REcOMMENDATION AND A STUDY
RLATING TO THE UNIFORM R, U S oF EviDFcE 1140 (1964).
49. J. MAGUIRE, J. WENSTEIN, J. CHADBOURN, & J. MANSFIELD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
EVIDENCE 729 (1965).
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of dictating to a jury so as to render its decision automatic, as is the
case with a Thayer presumption or the ALI minority report.
But how is the jury supposed to apply such language to the evidence
given? Does it mean that, if the defendant submits no counter evidence
and no reasonable doubt is raised, the law permits, but does not re-
quire, the finding of the presumed fact? The permissible inference
doctrine never answers this discomforting question. We do not believe
that judges or commentators are prepared to say that, in these cir-
cumstances, a jury nevertheless has no duty to find C. Could a defense
lawyer argue that although the defendant has given the jury absolutely
no reason to doubt the presumed fact, and although the jury does not
doubt it, the law permits but does not require them to find 0-there-
fore if they want to acquit the defendant, they may do so? If a defense
lawyer cannot so argue (and we believe that this is the case) can we still
with honesty employ the term permissible inference? Even if defense
counsel is allowed to argue as indicated above, since the "permissible
result" will nevertheless be imparted to the jury, the burden imposed
on the defendant will amount to a burden of persuasion. We submit
that the same dynamics of psychology as were described in the discus-
sion of the ALI majority report would render the jury strongly dis-
posed to find as the law suggests.
In summary, our basic objection to the term "permissible inference"
as distinguished from "required inference," is that it can only amount
to an alarming invitation to the jury to abandon its role as an honest
trier of fact. Until the law is prepared to allow such invitations, the
term "permissible" is inappropriate and misleading. The law ought
forthrightly to acknowledge that the burden of persuasion operating
under a "permissible inference" is no different from any other burden
of persuasion. The presumption has been transformed into an assump-
tion, and the tests formulated above should be employed to scrutinize
it.
We have laid the ground for the following statements: (1) Because
of the traditional protection given to defendants in criminal trials
against easy conviction by the state, more stringent standards of valid-
ity are necessary to sustain a presumption in a criminal case than in
a civil case, where the mere ordering of private relations and property
rights is at stake. (2) Presumptive language which operates to shift the
burden of persuasion is not distinguishable on any significant ground
from the creation of an affirmative defense. Whatever constitutional
standards apply to the proper creation of affirmative defenses should
201
The Yale Law Journal
apply to such a "presumption." Whatever those standards are they must
be more stringent than those employed where the effect of the pre-
sumptive language is merely to shift the burden of producing evidence.
(3) Some presumptive language is treated so that it does not technically
change the burden of persuasion, but rather simply reduces the ap-
plicable standard of proof to a preponderance of the evidence. Since
the operational effects of presumptive language applied in this manner
are similar to those produced by a change in the burden of persuasion,
the applicable standard of review should be nearly as high as that for
affirmative defenses. (4) Presumptive language which is applied against
a criminal defendant according to the ALl majority rule, the Cali-
fornia rule, or similar rules which create a "permissible inference,"
works as much or more hardship on the criminal defendant as the
same presumptive language applied according to the Thayer rule.
Therefore, a stronger rational connection and/or a greater ability to
produce exonerating evidence should be required than if the language
were applied according to the Thayer rule.
One case, as yet unmentioned, required the application of due pro.
cess standards to presumptive devices. In Leland v. Oregon,50 the Su-
preme Court considered an Oregon statute which imposed upon those
seeking to establish the defense of insanity a standard of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt. In upholding this conviction, the Court said that,
since the burden of proof was already on the defendant, they could not
say that this escalation of the standard of proof violated fundamental
notions of due process. They dismissed Tot and any considerations
involved therein as inapplicable since, in Leland, no presumption had
been created. We would hope that anyone who has read this far would
see that the issues raised by Leland were exactly the same as those
raised by Tot. The government in each case attempted to place a
larger share of the burden onto the defendant in regard to a germane
issue. In both cases the relevant issues were whether a threshold inter-
est which would justify the hardship imposed on defendants existed,
and whether the probability of innocent conviction created thereby
was too high to be tolerable.
We believe that when the state has created an affirmative defense, it
has pledged to release those for whom the defense is true. It is difficult
to understand how the government interest, when properly confined
to its evidentiary hardship, can ever be used to justify requiring the
50. 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
202
Vol. 79: 165, 1969
Due Process in Criminal Cases
defendant to prove his defense "beyond a reasonable doubt." The only
viable rationale for sanctioning a standard greater than "to a pre-
ponderance of the evidence," as was done in Leland, runs as follows:
Even though you, the defendant, have made it seem more likely
than not that you are innocent, we are going to convict you any-
way unless you prove your innocence beyond a reasonable doubt,
because too many guilty persons can make it seem more likely
than not that they are innocent, and the prosecution has such an
evidentiary hardship that it cannot counter such proof.
This rationale remains for us a hollow paradigm with no reference to
the real world; we have not been able to think of a single legitimate
interest of the state served by a defense entailing a standard of proof
higher than proof "to a preponderance of the evidence," which would
not also be served by that latter standard. Surely a presumptive or as-
sumptive device is unconstitutional if a less oppressive presumptive
or assumptive device would equally fulfill the legitimate interests of
the state but would result in fewer innocent individuals being con-
victed. We can only hope that, in Leland, the Court failed to consider
these factors, not because they were found to be irrelevant to consid-
erations of due process, but because they were not recognized.
VII. Some Problems of Wording
Let us now examine a form of presumptive language which has often
been employed in federal criminal statutes. In Gainey v. United
States,51 the Court -was forced to construe a statute reading:
Whenever on trial for violation of subsection (a)(1) [making it il-
legal to possess, or control the operation of an unregistered still]
defendant is shown to have been at the site or place where, and
at the time when, a still or distilling apparatus was set up with-
out having been registered, such presence of the defendant shall
be deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction, unless
the defendant explains such presence to the satisfaction of the
jury ... 52
A similar statute was encountered by the Court in Leary, but the case
was reversed on other grounds, and the questions raised were left un-
answered.5r In Gainey, the presumption was attacked on two grounds:
51. 380 US. 63 (1965).
52. 26 U.S.C. § 5601()(1) (1964).
53. 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
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that a legislative declaration that the fact proved was sufficient to con-
vict restricted the discretion of the trial judge in directing verdicts
and granting judgments n.o.v. for defendant so much as to be a denial
of due process, and that such a presumption constituted an unconsti-
tutional interference with the right to trial by jury.
The Court in Gainey decided that the presumption allowed the trial
judge all normal discretion regarding dismissals, directed verdicts and
judgments n.oxv. The second argument was rejected over a strong dis-
sent by Justice Black. We agree with the Court's result on the issues
it faced, so long as "sufficient evidence" is construed to mean no more
than a "permissible inference" and the effects of the inference are scruti-
nized as we have indicated above. However, there are two additional
important issues raised by this presumptive wording which were not
considered in the Gainey opinion.
According to the wording of these devices, the fact proved is de-
clared sufficient for conviction unless "explained to the satisfaction of
the jury." Two factors, of great importance to criminal defendants,
are not determined: what facts proved in explanation will satisfy the
jury, and what standard of proof is required.
An explanation "to the satisfaction of the jury" can be interpreted
to mean that the jury is free to be unsatisfied with any explanations of.
fered. Thus in the case of the marihuana statute, a jury, instructed that
possession must be explained to their satisfaction, may feel free to
convict despite proof of the non-imported status of the marihuana
involved. They may feel that the only explanation which will satisfy
them is the legality of the possession under state law, or the essential
goodness of the defendant, or some other ideal, or none of these. This
interpretation of the words "to the satisfaction of the jury" would not
cause the device to operate as a presumption or an assumption, but
rather would simply free the jury to do as they wish. The possibility
of this aberration can only be escaped if the jury is instructed that they
must find evidence of the absence of the nominally presumed elements
of the crime to be satisfactory.
Even if the jury is instructed as described above, the standard to
which the defendant must prove the absence of a presumed element
is not stipulated. Must he simply raise a reasonable doubt? Must he
make it appear more probable than not that the missing element is not
true? The jury is never instructed that they must, as a matter of
law, find that the defendant is innocent, if they are convinced that
there is a reasonable doubt as to the existence of the presumed fact.
They may convict the defendant if the absence of the presumed fact
is not proven to a moral certainty.
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Trial by jury implies that an impartial jury will address itself to
the germane issues of fact presented in a given case and come to an
honest conclusion about the existence of those facts to some independent
standard of certainty prescribed by law. If, as in the case of the lan-
guage here discussed, the jury is not told which facts, if established,
constitute a satisfactory explanation, if the jury is not instructed as to
how certain they must feel in order to treat these facts as established,
the jury is not operating as a controlled trier of fact, but rather is be-
ing turned loose on the defendant to exercise against him whatever
prejudices they may have.
VIII. A Note on Leary v. United States
Most of this article was written before the decision in Leary v.
United States54 was handed down. The authors looked forward to the
decision with anticipation since the statute involved presented in glar-
ing form the violations of due process which can result from the im-
proper drafting and implementation of presumptions. We were
prepared to make substantial changes in the text of this article. How-
ever, the Leary decision has added very little to the law of presump-
tions.
After examining numerous research reports and a vast amount of
testimony, the Court found that while there was a rational connection
between possession of marihuana and its illegal importation, there was
no rational connection between possession and knowledge of importa-
tion. Having found no rational connection between the fact proved
and the fact presumed, the Court considered its work done.
As noted above, the Court did for the first time commit itself to
the proposition that a rational connection means at least "more likely
than not." We have urged acceptance of this proposition, and its adop-
tion at this time may pave the way for the Court to arrive at the type
of constitutional analysis which we have presented here. Given this
interpretation of rational connection, however, unless the court is
willing to inquire into the number of innocent defendants who can
overcome a presumption or establish an affirmative defense, statutes
may be upheld which wrongly convict up to half of the individuals
convicted pursuant to them. This reasoning may explain the Court's
suggestion in Leary that the standard of "proof beyond a reasonable
doubt" may require a correlation stronger than a mere rational con-
54. Id.
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nection. The query, however, was neatly tucked away in a footnote and
left unanswered. 5 The major thrust of this article has been to urge
that such a higher correlation is required by due process.
The Leary opinion is merely another manifestation of the totally
inadequate jurisprudence in the area of presumptive and assumptive
devices. First the Court affirmed the misguided proposition that the
comparative convenience test is a corollary to the rational connection test.
Second, in holding the presumption of illegal importation constitu-
tional, the Court was apparently unimpressed by the fact that large
numbers of innocent defendants could not have proven their inno-
cence by showing they possessed domestic marihuana. As the Court
itself noted, users of marihuana in most instances do not know where
a particular batch was grown. Third, the Court apparently did not
question the significance of the trial judge's instructions, which im-
posed a burden of persuasion, in addition to a burden of introducing
evidence, upon the defendant, and was not particularly disturbed by
the meaning of the phrase "to the satisfaction of the jury."
The opinion, however, does raise two important issues with regard
to the role of stare decisis and retroactivity in cases involving presump-
tions. The Court made it clear that in assessing the existence of a
rational connection, courts should use current information and should
not restrict themselves to data and findings at the time of enactment
of the presumption. We applaud this approach in general, but does it
not mean that, in a society such as ours which is always changing, the
validity of a court's pronouncements regarding presumptions of fact
will become stale in but a few years? For example, if the presumption
in the Marihuana Import Act had been sustained in Leary, could a
federal court in an appeal ten years from now merely cite Leary as
authority for the validity of the presumption? Is not a continual re-
view of the facts giving rise to the rational connection necessary?
Analogous questions arise in regard to retroactivity. In 1969, the
Court found no rational connection between possession and knowledge
of illegal importation. But was this true in 1967 or 1961? In a habeas
corpus proceeding on behalf of a defendant convicted in 1961, may
the prosecution prove, notwithstanding Leary, that in 1961 the con-
nection between possession and knowledge of illegal importation was a
rational one? 6 In this regard, Leary contains one curious paragraph:
55. Id. at 36 n.64.
56. The Supreme Court seemed to suggest that this might be the case if there was
an insubstantial consumption of domestic marihuana. Id. at 37-39.
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The Government contends that Yee Hem requires us to read
the § 176a presumption as intended to put every marihuana
smoker on notice that he must be prepared to show that any
marihuana in his possession was not illegally imported, and that
since the possessor is the person most likely to know the mar-
ihuana's origin it is not unfair to require him to adduce evidence
on that point. However, we consider that this approach, which
closely resembles the test of comparative convenience in the pro-
duction of evidence, was implicitly abandoned in Tot v. United
States .... As was noted previously, the Tot Court confronted a pre-
sumption which allowed a jury to infer from possession of a fire-
arm that it was received in interstate commerce. Despite evidence
that most States prohibited unregistered and unrecorded acquisi-
tion of firearms, the Court did not read the statute as notifying
possessors that they must be prepared to show that they received
their weapons in intrastate transactions, as Yee Hem would seem
to dictate. Instead, while recognizing that "the defendants . ..
knew better than anyone else whether they acquired the firearms
or ammunition in interstate commerce," 319 U.S. at 469, the Court
held that because of the danger of overreaching it was incumbent
upon the prosecution to demonstrate that the inference was per-
missible before the burden of coming forvard could be placed
upon the defendant. This was a matter which the Yee Hem Court
either thought it unnecessary to consider or assumed when it de-
scribed the inference as "natural. ' 7
The implications of this statement are not dear. It may mean merely
that any inference from one proposition to another must be estab-
lished by him who has the burden of persuasion on the latter proposi-
tion. If so, the passage hardly deserves lengthy consideration. How-
ever, it may mean that the prosecution has the burden of establishing
the existence of a rational connection when a presumption is attacked
on constitutional grounds. The strongest argument against this in-
terpretation of the passage is that generally, with regard to issues of
constitutionality, the party which challenges a statute has the burden
of establishing unconstitutionality. The authors feel, however, that at
least with regard to presumptions and assumptions, the government
should have the burden of establishing the existence of a rational con-
nection. If the prosecution is to be relieved of proving its entire case
through the operation of a presumption against the particular defen-
dant, it should at least be required to prove the general validity of the
presumption. The Court's position in Leary is unclear, and the opinion
57. Id. at 44-45.
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in Tot, from which Harlan draws the proposition quoted above, does
not discuss this precise point.
Presumptive and assumptive devices are among the most basic ele-
ments in the judicial process. They shape, define, and alter how courts
and juries reach decisions. They are part of the epistemology of judicial
proceedings. The validity of all decisions which involve such devices
depends ultimately upon how they are administered. Unless standards
similar to those which we have suggested are adopted, the rights of
many innocent defendants may be compromised.
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